

1. Dissatisfaction with physics. Distinguo.
2. The physicist and the man. How to understand this distinction?
3. Rising wall between sc. and phil. Are they, then, distinct after all?
4. Today's sc. requires knowledge of Greek philosophy. Why?
5. Sc.: insight into man and his world. How related to 3.
6. Sc. merely states. Yet not mere description of phenomena, but conveys understanding. No contradiction here?
7. 'Curiosity' beginning of sc. Also used 'astonishment.' What about wonder?
8. Sc. is adjustment, step by step, of ideas to facts. Are the ideas prior?
9. We have certain fundamental notions; they are general, the object of understanding.
10. Sc. looks for the reason. Of what? Where is this reason to be found?
11. The term 'science' applies to all knowledge. What does this mean?
12. Value of natural sc., like that of any other branch of knowledge, is expressed by the command of the oracle: Know thyself. Why this prominence of the self? Is this utterly new?
13. History is 'scire' as much as physics. (Is the word 'scire' used by Schroedinger?) On what condition can this be true? 'Historia' means 'investigation' remaining in the state of investigation.
14. Unlike religion, sc. prefers to leave gaps. Is this to be understood as critical of religion? If so, how can this be made to agree with what he says of religion as irreplaceable by sc.?
15. The aim of sc. is not practical.
16. Specialisation worthless by itself. Discuss this point. Compare to evolution and dead-ends.
17. What is this unique goal, and what is the intrinsic unity of the search for knowledge? Is the Greek ideal a possible one?
18. The hypotheses of comprehensibility and objectivation are mistakes. What do these terms mean? In what sense is this perfectly true?
19. Determinism and free will. (Would be interesting to compare Schr.'s approach to the problem with that of Aristotle in Peri Herm., 9, 18 b 5.) Just what is the problem? What has priority, part or whole?

20. Distinction between consciousness and habit. Functions that adapt themselves to...Consciousness relates to learning; already knowing how, to habit. Bergson would introduce distinction between life and mechanism. What is the truth of the matter? What about contemplation as rest, as distinguished from investigation?
21. Division between object and subject to be rejected. If taken literally what would this entail? Still, in what particular sense could this be true?
22. What about "I am identical with the world and 'I' is everyone." St. Thomas, in his comm. on Phys.I, lect. 2, refers to the position of one who maintains that "totum ens est unus homo, quae quidem positio esset omnino improbabilis."
- How does Schroedinger compare to Parmenides? Notice how book I of the Physics is still relevant?
23. What does "esse est percipi" mean, apart from the historical context of Berkeley. For this opinion is reported by Aristotle, both in De Anima III, 2, 426 a 20; and Meta.IV, 5, 1010 b 30; V, 15, 1021 a 25.
24. "Intelligible chance."
25. Philosopher and unity of sciences.

Ad secundum dicendum quod esse simpliciter acceptum, secundum quod includit in se omnem perfectionem essendi, praeminet vitae, et omnibus perfectionibus subsequentibus. Sic igitur ipsum esse praehabet in se omnia bona subsequentia, et hoc modo Dionysius loquitur. Sed si consideretur ipsum esse, prout participatur in hac re vel in illa, quae non capiunt totam perfectionem essendi, sed habent esse imperfectum, sicut est esse cujuslibet creaturae; sic manifestum est quod ipsum esse cum perfectione superaddita est eminentius. Unde et Dionysius ibidem dicit, quod viventia sunt meliora existentibus, et intelligentia viventibus.

Ita II^a q. 2, a. 5, ad 2.

I believe the intellectual life of the whole of Western society is increasingly being split into two polar groups. ...at one pole we have the literary intellectuals...; at the other_x scientists, and as the most representative, the physical scientists. Between the two a gulf of mutual incomprehension--~~s~~ometimes (particularly among the young) hostility and dislike, but most of all lack of understanding. They have a curious distorted image of each other.

...Sed manifestatio eorum quae dependent ex voluntate intelligentis non potest dici illuminatio, sed locutio tantum; puta, si aliquis alteri dicat: Volo hoc addiscere: Volo hoc vel illud facere. Cujus ratio est quia voluntas creata non est lux, nec regula veritatis, sed participans lucem. Unde communicare ea quae sunt a voluntate creata, in quantum huiusmodi, non est illuminare. Non enim pertinet ad perfectionem intellectus mei, quid tu velis, vel quid tu intelligas, cognoscere, sed solum quid rei veritas habeat.

Ia, p. 107, a. 2, c.

Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod locutio illa est
synecdochia; ponitur enim pars principalis, scilicet
anima, pro toto homine, et hic modus loquendi consuetus
est in sacra Scriptura et apud philosophos; unde
Philosophus dicit IX Ethic., cap. VIII vel IX, quod
totus homo dicitur intellectus, per modum quo etiam
tota civitas dicitur rector civitatis.

In II S., d. 18, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1.

... Virtutes operativae quae in rebus inveniuntur, frustra essent rebus attributae, si per eas nihil operarentur; quinimo, omnes res creatae viderentur quodammodo esse frustra, si propria operatione destituerentur; cum omnes res sint propter suam operationem. Semper enim imperfectum est propter perfectius. Sicut igitur materia est propter formam, ita forma, quae est actus primus, est propter suam operationem, quae est actus secundus; et sic operatio est finis rei creatae.

I^a, p. 105, a. 5, c.

La puissance de l'être substantiel, tant au p^{er}.
actualité qu'au p^{er}. l'ont.

C'est grâce à son ~~acte~~ actualité ultime qu'une chose
peut atteindre à sa perfection, qu'elle peut honorer
sa perfection.

Quelle est l'actualité, l'être le plus parfait qui
se puisse concevoir comme bien intrinsèque à
l'œuvre créée?

Ce n'est pas l'être substantiel, car per, encore
qu'il soit le plus fondamental et ~~le plus~~
présupposé absolument.

~~Ce n'est pas non plus la p^{er}~~
Ce n'est pas non plus l'être en tant que
le plus commun. Ni même la seule puissance
active, quelle qu'elle soit.

Généralement parlant, c'est l'opération en acte,
que S. Thomas qualifie de "finis rei creatae".

Mais c'est plus particulièrement l'actualité de
vivre et, souverainement, celle de penser.

Quant à l'actualité de vivre, elle s'exprime ~~par~~ ^{ambiguë} ~~par~~
dans ~~l'expression~~ s'énonce dans l'expression, à la
fois figurée et substantielle, "vivens vivens est ens."

Et parce que l'acte de penser est aussi l'être vivant
le plus parfait et connu de toute autre actualité, on
peut dire, à juste titre, que "intelligenti homini
est ens."

Il est vrai, comme S. Thomas le fait remarquer, qu'il s'agit là
de synecdoque, expression figurée où le tout est désigné
suivant sa partie principale.

Si donc nous entendons le terme acte, actualité, qu'on
au sens figuré, mais c'est lui qui exprime, très parfaitement
pour nous, bien qu'imparfaitement en soi, l'actualité
la plus intime et la plus ultime.

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Materia corporis vivi est id qd comparatur
ad vitam sicut potentia ad actum.
Et hic actus est anima, secundum
quem corpus vivit.

Figura est actus
corporis qd est
subjectum figurae, qd
comparatur ad figuram
sicut potentia ad
actum

Corpus subjectum comparatur
ad figuram sicut
potentia ad actum

Materia corporis
vivi comparatur
ad animam
ut pot. ad actum

UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME

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DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

La proposition que le bien commun est plus divin que le bien personnel se verifie dans l'ordre surnaturel autant que dans l'ordre naturel et politique.

Comm. C'est parce que Dieu est un bien commun, le bien commun par excellence, que nous l'aimons davantage que nous-memes et que nous devons aimer le prochain par amour de Dieu. Quand S. Thomas dit que Dieu a le caractere de 'tout' il faut l'entendre d'un 'totum ante partes'--ce qui met bien en evidence que l'expression 'bien commun' est analogique. Dans l'ordre de l'imposition des noms, 'bien commun' se verifie pour nous le plus manifestement dans la famille, savoir: de l'enfant. Par contre, si nous considerons l'ordre des choses, c'est Dieu qui a, par rapport a ses oeuvres, le ~~caractere~~ plus profondement la nature de bien commun.

(I) Meta V, 8.

(1)

Proportio unum quacunque in hoc conveniunt, qd hoc se habet
ad illud sicut aliud ad aliud:

(a) - vel eo quod aliqua duo habent diversas habitudines ad unum;
sicut sanarium de veina dictum habitudinem significat
signi sanitatis; de medicina vero, quia signif. habitudinem
causae respectu ejusdem. Hoc illud est verbum.

(b) - Vel in eo quod est eadem proportio duorum ad diversa,
sicut temp. ^{ad} mare et seren. ad arem. Quis.

(II) De Ver. II, 11.

Convenientia secundum proportionem 2x, unde 2x analogiae communitas:

Sic ens dicitur
de sub. et accid.
x habitudine quam
sub. et accid.
habent; et sanum
de urina et animali

(a) - quaedam convenientia inter ipsa quorum est ad invicem
proportio, eo quod habent determinatam distantiam
vel aliam habitudinem ad invicem, sicut binarius
cum unitate, eo qd est ejus duplum;

(b) - quaedam convenientia est duorum ad invicem inter quae
non sit proportio, sed magis similitudo duarum
ad invicem proportionum, sicut 6 convenit cum 4
~~quatenus~~ x hoc quod sicut 6 est duplum 3, ita
4 dupl. 2. [$\frac{6}{3}$ ut $\frac{4}{2}$] Haec est convenientia
proportionalitatis.

Sic nomen visus
de visu corp. et
intellectu, eo qd...

Impossibile est qd primo modo (a) analogiae aliquid dicatur
de deo et creatura: nulla creatura habet talem habitudinem
ad deum per quam possit divina perfectio determinari.
Sed in secundo modo (b) nulla determinata habitudo attenditur
inter ea quibus existit: ... per analogiam communem.
Et secundum istum modum (i.e. proportionalitatis) nihil
prohibet aliquid nomen analogia dici de deo et creatura.

III) de Pot. VII, 7:

(2)

Duplex modus praed. anal.

- (a) Unus quo aliquid praedicatur de duobus per respectum ad aliquod tertium, sicut ens de qualitate et quantitate per respectum ad substantiam.
- (b) Alius modus est quo aliquid praedicatur de duobus per respectum unius ad alterum, sicut ens de substantia et quantitate.

- In primo modo ^(a) oportet esse aliquid prius duobus, ad qd ambo respectum habent, sicut substantia ad quantitatem et qualitatem;
- in secundo (b) autem non, sed necesse est unum esse prius altero. Sic secundus convertit in divina praedicationem, et non primus.

(IV) Ia, XIII, 5:

dicti secundum anal. Alter contrahit in nomen ubi.

- (a) vel quia multa habent proportionem ad unum, sicut sanum dicitur de medicina et urina in quantum utrumque habet proportionem ad sanitatem animalis; cupit urina signum est, medicina vero causa.

- (b) vel ex eo quod unum habet proportionem ad alterum, sicut sanum dicitur de medicina et animali. Et hoc modo (b) aliqua dicuntur de deo et creaturis analogia... Et iste modus communiter medicus est... et nomen per se multipliciter dicitur, significat diversas proportionis ad aliquid unum, sicut sanum de urina dictum significat signum sanitatis animalis, de medicina vero dictum significat causam eiusdem sanitatis.

¶ de Ver. Excluditur modus quo aliquid participatione de dictis per respectum
unum ad alterum (ut Animum de medicina et animali, et evo de subst. et accidenti)
 propter determinatam distantiam.

¶ de Pot. Excluditur modus quo aliquid de dictis per respectum ad
aliquid tertium, sicut un de quat. et quat. per respectum ad substantiam.
 Ratio: Quia duo nihil prius. Admittitur modus quo aliquid participatione
 de dictis per respectum unius ad alterum, ut eorum de medicina et
 animali, et evo de substantia et quantitate.

Ans. Admittit modum qui excluditur in de Univ. (a)

¶ ¶ Ia excludit modum quo nulla habens proportionem ad unum tertium.
 Admittit modum quo unum habet proportionem ad alterum, sicut
 eorum dictum de medicina et animali, et evo de subst. et accidenti.

Sed iste modus excluditur in de Verit.
 Et tamen, in fine experientia, admittit modum quo nulla habens proportionem
 ad unum, ubi "nomen quod sic intelligitur dictum, significat aliter
 proportionem ad aliquid illius, sicut scilicet de verba dictum significat signum
 sonitus animalis, de medicina vero dictum significat causam quaedam
 sanitatis." [¶ Hoc hoc per se in quo aliter debet recipi ut tertium quod videt.]

- (i) commune { (a) ne multoties : apprehension
(In Nat. Phil., this is in fact the same as (b) for the most part.)
(b) magis notum : learning
(Phys III, l. 1 : first about communia, wherever possible.)

② Constitutum: it is not an instance of a ^{principle in} natural things, but a simile.

(3) Artific. Kings last. Quare?

Quia gnt ad "esse principium" magis manifestum in naturis, ut patet in motu locali; deinde in aliis praedicamentis. Deinde in moralibus, etne consilii. Ultimo in artif. Sed hoc semper sub etne, non "quodquid erat esse" sed in ratione principii.

④ In fine lect. sae (Meta. V), de lmo. Vol. Eth. I, l. 7, an. 94-96.

Aliquid dici de multis secundum diversas rationes contingit
dupliciter:

explicitē:
(a) secundum rationes omnino diversas non habentes respectum ad unum.
Et ita dicendum aequivocū a casu.

(b) unum nomen dicitur de multis secundum rationes diversas non totaliter, sed in aliquo uno convenientes.

(x) Quandoque introe ad reformationem ad unum
principium, sicut eo aliqua dicitur militaris,
vel quia instrumentum militis, sicut gladius,
vel tegumentum, vel equus.

(B) quandoque in hoc qd referuntur ad unum finem,
sicut medicina ~~est~~ dicitur sana, ut factiva
sanitati, dicta ut conservativa, urina ut significat.

(x) quandocumque secundum proportionem diversas
ad idem subiectum,

ad idem subiectum,

(i) ut qualitas dicitur esse ens, quia est
dispositio per se entis seu substantiae;
quantitas vero ut mensura ejusdem, et
sic de aliis;

(ii) vel secundum unam proportionem ad diversa
subiecta, ut $\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{vires} \\ \text{ad} \\ \text{corpus} \end{array} \right\} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{intellectus} \\ \text{ad} \\ \text{animam.} \end{array} \right.$

1^o Example of "form" & "matter"; union & apert.
cf. Met. 4, c. 2, Lect. 1, nn. 535 & 536.

Note "ad unum" aliquot et idem.

See text at 544 showing the "una natura" with respect to which
whatever is called being *Sei* substance is so called.

Analogical names are necessary because of the nature of our knowing as rational: ~~and~~ ~~animals~~ we go from what we know more to what we know less: the reverse of the order of things. This is our way of knowing. Speech is the expression of what we know: of ~~the~~ things as we know them. This obliges us to name the things we come to know with dependence upon those we already know, according to the latter. E.g. "healthy" is said of the animal, absolutely. But we also speak of healthy medicine and healthy diet and healthy urine. Medicine restores health in the animal, healthy diet preserves it, and urine is a sign of it. Now suppose we had to invent a new name ~~for~~ to stand instead of 'healthy' in the latter cases, reserving the first term to the animal? The relationship of final cause, means and sign would not be expressed.

(Effic) Another example: medicationum.

- of doctor
- of the person apt to acquire the art
- of what is needed for healing: medicines and instruments, labraris, etc.

(Subj) Still another: "being"

- 1^o of substance
- 2^o per se accidentia
- 3^o via ad subd.: generation of m.b.
- 4^o via ad non-esse: corrupt.
- 5^o privationis are priv. of subd. forms.
- 6^o qualities or other accidents are beings because they are conducive to bring about something substantial, e.g. heart.
Or are said to be because of some other relationship (individual) to substance.
- 7^o The negation of things so related to substance, or even the negation of substance itself. They are said to be 'negation'.

Thus we say 'non-being' is 'non-being' or 'nothing is nothing'?

Now all these modes of being can be reduced to four genera:

- 1° debilitissimum: in reason alone: negation and privation:
reason bears upon them as if they were something,
in denying or affirming. (Diff. betw. neg. & priv., lect. 3).
- 2° proximum in debilitate: generatio, cor., et motus: they
imply some measure of privation and negation.
- 3° that which has nothing of non-being in the previous senses;
still "habet em debile" because it is not per se,
but in another, such as qualities, properties, and
properties of substances.
- 4° quod est perfectissimum substantiae - to which all
the other genera are referred.

The Hollow Universe

Footnote to page 43, at the
end of first paragraph: ...intended
to signify.

* If called upon to justify the distinction between mind and nature, or between rational and real, I would point to the difference between contraries as in our knowing, and as in fact. In fact a man cannot at the same time see and be blind; but in knowing blindness, he must simultaneously grasp what sight is. For sight is implicit in the very notion of blindness, just as any positive term is essential to its negation, and the perception of one term as contrary is ~~is~~ dependent upon the representation of its opposite. This supposes a radical difference between the corresponding real subjects of any contrariety. So, if the differences between contraries are held to be finally one and the same, the real, as distinguished from the rational, will involve contradiction (which is the way some people want it): just as one cannot conceive blindness without simultaneously conceiving sight, nor think death without thinking life, so one could not actually see without being actually blind, nor be alive without being also dead. This impossibility cannot be escaped by anyone who refuses to allow a significant distinction between mind and nature. All the same, there are instances of simultaneous contrariety outside the mind — providing ample room for confusion. A plant, for instance, grows in contrary directions; and a thing becoming white is neither determinately white nor not-white. But these cases differ widely from that of the mind: the first involves parts that are quantitatively external to one another, while becoming remains this side of full actuality.



N.B.

On page 43, line 8, delete the following: / A man should not
be expected first to prove that he has a mind unless his argument
are to suppose the old distinction /
The subsequent sentence should read: / Right now it is my
harmless - - - /

Utrum animal aquaticum mutata forma possit fieri agreste

Quaeritur ulterius, utrum animal aquaticum mutata forma possit fieri agreste.

(1) Videtur, quod non. Dicitur enim IV METEORUM in veteri translatione: 'Sciunt artifices alchimiae species transmutari non posse, sed alterari'; sed non est minor diversitas inter animalia quam inter metalla; ergo etc.

(2) Item, a genere in genus non fit transitio; sed pisces et aves 'differunt genere' per PHILOSOPHUM in principio HUIUS; ergo eadem ratione animal agreste et aquaticum differunt genere, et per consequens unum in aliud non est transibile. Oppositum dicit PHILOSOPHUS.

Dicendum, quod animal dupliciter potest considerari; aut ratione materiae aut ratione formae. Si ratione formae, sic unum in aliud non est transmutabile. Sicut enim albedo non fit nigrudo, sic nec una species animalis mutari potest in aliam. Si tamen consideretur animal ratione materiae, sic in invicem transmutari possunt. Contingit enim, quod materia existens sub una specie multum est affinis materiae alterius speciei, et ideo recedente forma unius potest in materia induci forma alterius. Sicut patet in cadaveribus mortuorum, cum generantur vermes et strabones. Istud etiam patet in generatione quorundam animalium, quae fiunt per media, sicut patet in ranis. Ex semine enim ranarum generantur quaedam animalia nigra habentia caudas, quae postmodum abiectis caudis assument pedes, et prius viventia in aqua postmodum vivunt in terra. Ratio autem, quare aquaticum animal fit agreste et non e contrario, potest esse, quia per frigiditatem aquae potest ingrossari materia animalis aquatici in tantum, quod habilis est ad formam agrestis. Sed animal agreste, quanto magis durat, tanto magis tendit ad siccitatem et per consequens est remotius a natura animalis aquatici.

(1) Ad rationes: Ad primam dicendum, quod una species metalli numquam fit alia, etsi per alchimiam potest fieri, quod una species appareat esse alia. Eodem modo est in animalibus, quod una species non fit alia, licet post speciem unius in eadem materia possit induci species alterius.

(2) Ad secundam dicendum, quod animal aquatile, gressibile et volatile non differunt ~~in~~ genere, quia sub animali non est aliud genus. Dicit tamen PHILOSOPHUS piscem et avem genere differre, quia in proprietatibus generalibus differunt, sicut per diversas differentias motus. Posito tamen, quod piscis et avis genere propinquo differant, non tamen differunt genere praedicabili nec genere naturali, quia in materia conveniunt, et quae conveniunt in materia, ab uno non possunt fieri genere in alterum.

St. Albert the Great, Quaestiones super de Animalibus, Liber I, q. 5 (Opera Omnia, Vol. 12, Westphalia: 1955).

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/ Raison de la diversité dans la Nature: A.R. Wallace:
ce: THE WORLD OF LIFE, p. 391.

"It is that this earth with its infinitude of life and beauty and mystery, and the universe in the midst of which we are placed, with its overwhelming immensities of suns and nebulae, of light and motion, are as they are, firstly, for the development of life culminating in man; secondly, as a vast school-house for the higher education of the human race in preparation for the enduring spiritual life to which it is destined."

L'organisation progressive de l'univers a
pour terme l'homme animal raisonnable: Alfred
Russel Wallace: MAN'S PLACE IN THE UNIVERSE p.321.

L'immensité de l'univers et sa complexité est
pour l'homme une révélation de la grandeur et de
la puissance de Dieu: A.R. Wallace: MAN'S PLACE
IN THE UNIVERSE, p. 331.

The Relevance of ordinary speech as ~~expressing common thought~~
expressing common thought.

O.L. can ask 'What is a man?'

Sc. ask 'how much does this weigh?'

No cult of ordinary language. Yet it expresses the things we know first and, on the whole, allows us ~~x~~ to ask questions. It soon appears that there are questions of different types. E.g., what is a man? what is a centaur. Centaur~~s~~ are in our heads. They have been constructed from materials outside our heads. But, unlike houses, they cannot be put out there--except by Walt Disney.

Bertrand Russell made a point some years ago in Human Knowledge, and he has since clarified^{this} in his later ~~book~~ My Mental Development. It is widely different from what he said in Problems of Philosophy.

In this latter work he had said:.....

Fortunately he has since had a change of mind. He now sees philosophy is not that distinct from science and that it is carried on through science and after. Actually can hardly fail to philosophize. But the point is that his science may be very good and his philosophy just as bad.

There is today, particularly among the greater of =
physicists
German/~~xxxxxxxx~~, a groping towards unity which had been
all but lost by the over-simplification which was still very
the
general at the turn of ~~this~~/century.

Generative mechanism of at unba —
 $\text{Hd} \cdot \underline{\text{I}}, \text{L} \cdot \underline{\text{S}}$
 $\underline{\text{VI}}, \text{L} \cdot \underline{\text{S}}, \text{H}^{\circ}, \text{L} \cdot \underline{\text{S}}, \text{H}^{\circ}$
 $\text{H}^{\circ}, \underline{\text{I}}, \text{H}^{\circ}, \text{L} \cdot \underline{\text{I}}, \text{H}^{\circ}$

The whole animal sphere is moved by its desire for pleasure - in least, pleasure sought as an end.

Memory is the womb of time
" the grave of time.

Macbrury
Nahua maculata Ellis by little from many others...
H. A. VIII 1, 58864-25
P. A. IV 5, 6812-30

Third person, O K, provided
not just numerically Third.

But some hardened criminals
turn out to be psychopaths whose behavior
~~actions~~ emanates more from their
chemistry than from their will.

Physical being prior to life.

Existence prior to animal life. . .

Physic contact in each of the extm. senses.

(Notice 'contact' - tangible - a way of saying that there are various ways of touching as ~~applied~~ found in external sensation) The sensible is ~~the~~ the said.

Variety. Calls for comparison: Senses common.

Notice dispersion of touch
of various senses

collected, compared, and judged by S. common.

Gathering in of dispersion.

Imagination: Knowledge of absent, wasted.

Memory: want of time. Else time grave-digger.

Exteriority { place: sui generis
motion: what there is of motion incessantly was.
time: waste of what cannot be laid in the
individuals. Time a grave-digger because of motion.
Yet measure. But both must call
for intellect.

Since Descartes, human soul foreign to nature. Human body,
~~a machine steered about by a~~ ^{complex} ~~res extensa~~ steered about
by the res inextensa, the human soul. A man is
not a work of nature. Not like Plato, yet...

We are not in the world of matter, of body, as one thing is
another. We are ~~both~~ material substances, differ from
other material substances by a strictly immat. prin.

Thèmes:

Analogie (testes)

destin ^{entre} triomphe par se
eux pas accidents

hasard et fortune (Phys. II)

dialectique

continence

nombre (plusieurs pages)

Phys. I

temps

Analogie

Textes : I^o 19, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1.

I^a, q. 13, aa. 5, 6, 10; I^a, q. 107, a. 1.; I^a q. 16, a. 3. - Nie l'univoc
des noms d
Q. 9. I, 34.

de Ver. q. 2, a. 11. Nie l'équivocité des noms divins.

I^a q. 4, a. 3. Compar. Q. de An. a. 2, ad 5.

II Sent. d. 13, q. 1, ad 2. Comm. par analogie.

(Comm. par analogie sans forme analogue: métaphore)
la poésie.

Dans toute comm. par analogie, le genre de ce qui est connu
par analogie n'est pas connu par le connaissant. Différent
genre. Il faut donc le manifester par le genre connu.

Etudier l'un: { naturellement: Met. I, l. 7, nn. 848-875 incl.
l'opice: celui-ci inclut l'analogie. Met. I, l. 8, 876

[L'analogie porte sur l'intentionnel - c'est la représentation typique
qui fonde l'analogie.] [S. Th. parle de "praedicatio"]

L'analogie est huitie, & propre, dans les Antepred.

Le terme "sanum" est aussi analogue que "bonum", mais
la santé ne se trouve pas dans le médicament.

Aequivoca: les choses "placae aequantur in nomine solum".
Dans les qualogues aussi, la seule égalité est celle qui
se trouve dans les noms. Idem Arist. inclut l'analogie
sous le nom d'équiv.

L'analogie, comme intention seconde, est une propriété des
choses en tant que connues, représentées. La communauté
de ces choses, qui fonde l'analogie, est une œuvre de
l'intelligence.

Le principe de la signification d'un mot ("id ad quod imp.")
c'est l'usage.

L'"id ad quod" du mot "analogia" chez les Latins,
c'est tout ce qui n'est pas équivoque et pas ~~analogie~~ univoque.
Sed, chez les grecs, analogie s'oppose à analogie d'attribution.
Chez les Latins, anal. signifie et celle d'attrib. et celle de proportion.

Quand on dit "aequivoca", on réfère à "id a quo nomen impon.", c'est à dire à l'égalité dans le nom, i.e. selon "id a quo". Mais, quant à la signification (id ad quod), il n'y a pas d'égalité du tout. "dicuntur et non sunt". SAlb. Praed., c. 2, p. 5a.

Le que les aequivoca ont en commun: l'identité du nom comme son de voix, et non quant à sa forme artificielle ou signification. Celle-ci à distinguer de la forme intrins. du mot: sa figure donnée par les lettres, syllabes...

Analogie: espèce d'équivoque.

L'équiv. comprend deux { idem nomen
id quod significatur non est idem vel
aeque participatum ab illis quibus
nomen imponitur.

SAlb. p. 5b.
deux formes se
dist. comme
perfectio prima
et secunda.
Itaque potest
mutari et
manente voce

Le nom, commun, ne signifie pas proprement un universel.

Equiv., ici, opposé à univoque ita qu'il embrasse { pur equiv.
et analogue.

du moment qu'il s'agit de la "ratio significata", il n'y a plus d'égalité.

Ainsi "sapere" signifie des natures diverses: homme, ange, dieu; non pas "una ratio".

La "ratio propria entis": substance. "Es per accidens" appelé "ens" prop. il se rattache comme à "ens per se". - La "ratio propria sanitatis" ne se trouve que dans "animal".

L'analogie se dit par rapport à qq chose d'un et à cause de cela il est plus près de l'univoque.

L'analogie se dit proprement des noms - noms que l'intelligence et la volonté imposent. Les choses ne peuvent être dénommées analogues qu'en tant que connues et signifiées. De m. qu'il y a des choses qui répugnent à être dénommées genres, à être fondement de l'intention seconde de genre; il en est qui répugnent à être fondement de l'intention seconde de l'analogie.

On définit l'analogie par la "ratio", pas par les choses considérées absol.

Le terme analogue "sain" d'un,
mais la santé n'est pas une.

I S. d. 19, p. 5, c. 2, ad.
omni objection.

Le terme analogue se distingue des autres en ce qu'il signifie plusieurs natures genericquement distincts. Il faut un ordre dans les choses comme fondement des multiples significations établies par l'imposition - un prius et posterius.

La forme du mot et la signification analogue: { un mot
signif. multiples
C'est l'intelligence qui constitue le terme analogue. Un terme est univoque tant que l'intelligence et la volonté n'ont pas usé du mot pour signifier plusieurs choses. Il n'y a pas de concept de soi analogue.

L'analogie n'est autre chose que le *primo* et *posterius* entendus sur le plan de la prédication.

Il n'est pas nécessaire que le premier analogue soit la cause des autres, mais unigt "illud in quo primo ratio illius communis completa invenitur", i.e. "ratio propria invenitur in uno".
det. 1, a. 2.

"Invenitur sec. rationem in uno tantum a quo alia denominantur" ne signifie pas la dénomination extrinsèque. La doctrine de l'analogie comme telle ne nous permet pas d'affirmer ou d'exclure la forme intrinsèque.

[En faisant une métaphore, le poète rend commun un mot qui ne l'est pas.]

Quelquefois le '*primo ordine impositivis*' et le '*primo sec. ord. rerum*' sont le m. e.p. : substance. *ep 134*

"*Diversae proportionis ad unum*." Analq. d'attrib.

"*Eadem proportio ad diversa*", analq de proportionnalité.

Det. I, l. 8, n. 879

IP. 19, 9. 5, a. 2.

Relativa secundum esse:

de PoT, c. 7, a. 11.

relata: relation médicamentale.

rationis: relation de raison.

Relativa secundum dici sont propres aux noms comme tels: des noms qui signifientum absolu - une substance, une qualité - mais lequel attribue l'intelligence rapportée à autre chose. Tel "Seigneur", qui signifie la substance divine indirectement. "Pens", et "science", aussi des relativa secundum dici, mais leur rapport à l'objet est un rapport réel.

Relativum secundum dici n'est ident. à relation de raison, ni à relation/puissance. Scitur ad aliquid, sed non est ad aliquid.

me l'univocité

(1) pas analogie du tout.

"opposé à l'univogue.

ême, mais la participation secundum se tantum";

et, par conség., univoque. V. p. animalité plus parfaite dans l'homme que dans l' brute. Pas véritable analogie par "secundum se tantum". Le mot n'est employé pour participation inégales, mais la ratio n'en compte pas.

(2) Pour Caj., la ratio se trouve dans un seul, et les autres sont simplement dénommés par des extrêmes.



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L'analogie, en tant qu'opposée à l'univocité, comme l'univocité elle-même, appartient strictement à l'ordre logique.

Cajetan divise l'analogie en analogie:

- (1) d'inequité
- (2) d'attribution
- (3) de proportionnalité.

Seule la (3), dit-il, est vraiment analogie; (2) abusive; (1) pas analogie du tout.

En réalité, l'analogie n'est pas de tout ce qui s'oppose à l'univocité.

- (1) inég. : le nom est commun, la déf. est la même, mais la participation est inégale. C'est une analogie "secundum esse tantum", et, par conséq., univoque. V.p. animalité plus parfaite dans l'homme que dans l'âne. Pas véritable analogie par "secundum esse tantum". Le nom est employé pour participation inégale, mais la ratio n'en compte pas.

- (2) Pour Caj., la ratio se trouve dans un seul, et les autres sont simplement dénommés par des. extrins.

The negation of action for an end in nature
leads, ~~to~~ on the one hand, to ~~the~~ ^{the} reification of
dialectics (as in Hegel, ~~Engels~~ ^{and} Marxism)
and, on the other, to an obliteration of the
distinction between ens per se and ens per
accidens.

~~dialectical~~

Philosophies which rely dialectics are the natural result of previous attempts to explain all things and events ~~in terms of~~ ^{in terms of} what Aristotle and St. Thomas ^{had described} as 'causes that are prior in being' (Physics II, c. 8), which is the result of denying the priority of final cause. ~~in nature~~ For it is nature's ~~action for an end~~ ^{whether} nature is amongst the causes ~~that~~ which act for the sake of something, "hoc vult ad quaestionem de providentia et operis." (St. Thomas, ibid., lect. 12, n. 1).

As the Angelic Doctor goes on to show, the rejection of the priority of the good ~~in nature~~ as the cause of causes, would entail that whatever ~~comes about~~ happens in nature would be ~~absolutely~~ necessary and yet purely contingent?

~~Hegel tried to reconcile this necessity~~ It is this kind of necessity ~~which~~ which Hegel tried to

salvage by making it proceed from 'logical thought'. ~~What he means by logic~~ ^{what} ~~has barely had~~ the same in common with Aristotle. This logical thought resembles somewhat the dialectical process as St. Thomas described it in Post. An. II, (lect. 10, n. 5).

(e.g. Descartes, Leibniz)

This nominalism: calculation's abstr. from real and rational.

In the face of Hegelian Idealism, on the one hand, and of Existentialism on the other, modern Thomists, on the whole, fail to stress the idea of the good, ~~the~~ and of the appetite by which we define it.

In the face of ~~modern~~ modern dialectical philosophies, which attempt to explain all things "ex causis prioribus in esse", and of ^{the} Existentialism which ~~posits~~ ^{positing,} 'that a thing is' before the thing, ~~being~~ 'what it is', to conclude, logically, that all is contingent.

~~That~~ at least according to a priority of nature, 'that a thing is', before its being 'what it is'.

Et omnibus sub eodem "casu" inveniuntur;
 non ita qd omnia quae in eis fiunt
 sint casualia; sed quia in quolibet
 eorum aliquid casuale inveniri potest.
 Et hoc ipsum quod aliquid casuale
 invenitur in huiusmodi libris, demonstrat ea
 obsequio gubernationi esse subiecta. Nisi
 enim huiusmodi consuetudines et alia in
 scriptis gubernarentur, nihil intruderent,
 maxime quae non cognoscuntur: et sic non
 existeret in eis aliquid praeter intentionem,
 quod facit eorum casus... etc.

103/5/lot.

Physics II Fortuna l.g.

poies II. Forma l. 9.

^{Sometimes called his devotion to synthetic experience}
"Nearby Spencer says that every fact has two opposite sides, 'the one its near or visible side and the other its remote or invisible side', he stresses a persistent fact of every object in experience. The visible is set in the invisible; and in the end what is ~~seen~~ unseen decides what happens in the seen;

^{with a fact of diss. experience. When he}

l. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 245. 246. 247. 248. 249. 250. 251. 252. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257. 258. 259. 260. 261. 262. 263. 264. 265. 266. 267. 268. 269. 270. 271. 272. 273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279. 280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 285. 286. 287. 288. 289. 290. 291. 292. 293. 294. 295. 296. 297. 298. 299. 300. 301. 302. 303. 304. 305. 306. 307. 308. 309. 310. 311. 312. 313. 314. 315. 316. 317. 318. 319. 320. 321. 322. 323. 324. 325. 326. 327. 328. 329. 330. 331. 332. 333. 334. 335. 336. 337. 338. 339. 340. 341. 342. 343. 344. 345. 346. 347. 348. 349. 350. 351. 352. 353. 354. 355. 356. 357. 358. 359. 360. 361. 362. 363. 364. 365. 366. 367. 368. 369. 370. 371. 372. 373. 374. 375. 376. 377. 378. 379. 380. 381. 382. 383. 384. 385. 386. 387. 388. 389. 390. 391. 392. 393. 394. 395. 396. 397. 398. 399. 400. 401. 402. 403. 404. 405. 406. 407. 408. 409. 410. 411. 412. 413. 414. 415. 416. 417. 418. 419. 420. 421. 422. 423. 424. 425. 426. 427. 428. 429. 430. 431. 432. 433. 434. 435. 436. 437. 438. 439. 440. 441. 442. 443. 444. 445. 446. 447. 448. 449. 450. 451. 452. 453. 454. 455. 456. 457. 458. 459. 460. 461. 462. 463. 464. 465. 466. 467. 468. 469. 470. 471. 472. 473. 474. 475. 476. 477. 478. 479. 480. 481. 482. 483. 484. 485. 486. 487. 488. 489. 490. 491. 492. 493. 494. 495. 496. 497. 498. 499. 500. 501. 502. 503. 504. 505. 506. 507. 508. 509. 510. 511. 512. 513. 514. 515. 516. 517. 518. 519. 520. 521. 522. 523. 524. 525. 526. 527. 528. 529. 530. 531. 532. 533. 534. 535. 536. 537. 538. 539. 540. 541. 542. 543. 544. 545. 546. 547. 548. 549. 550. 551. 552. 553. 554. 555. 556. 557. 558. 559. 560. 561. 562. 563. 564. 565. 566. 567. 568. 569. 570. 571. 572. 573. 574. 575. 576. 577. 578. 579. 580. 581. 582. 583. 584. 585. 586. 587. 588. 589. 590. 591. 592. 593. 594. 595. 596. 597. 598. 599. 600. 601. 602. 603. 604. 605. 606. 607. 608. 609. 610. 611. 612. 613. 614. 615. 616. 617. 618. 619. 620. 621. 622. 623. 624. 625. 626. 627. 628. 629. 630. 631. 632. 633. 634. 635. 636. 637. 638. 639. 640. 641. 642. 643. 644. 645. 646. 647. 648. 649. 650. 651. 652. 653. 654. 655. 656. 657. 658. 659. 660. 661. 662. 663. 664. 665. 666. 667. 668. 669. 670. 671. 672. 673. 674. 675. 676. 677. 678. 679. 680. 681. 682. 683. 684. 685. 686. 687. 688. 689. 690. 691. 692. 693. 694. 695. 696. 697. 698. 699. 700. 701. 702. 703. 704. 705. 706. 707. 708. 709. 710. 711. 712. 713. 714. 715. 716. 717. 718. 719. 720. 721. 722. 723. 724. 725. 726. 727. 728. 729. 730. 731. 732. 733. 734. 735. 736. 737. 738. 739. 740. 741. 742. 743. 744. 745. 746. 747. 748. 749. 750. 751. 752. 753. 754. 755. 756. 757. 758. 759. 760. 761. 762. 763. 764. 765. 766. 767. 768. 769. 770. 771. 772. 773. 774. 775. 776. 777. 778. 779. 780. 781. 782. 783. 784. 785. 786. 787. 788. 789. 790. 791. 792. 793. 794. 795. 796. 797. 798. 799. 800. 801. 802. 803. 804. 805. 806. 807. 808. 809. 810. 811. 812. 813. 814. 815. 816. 817. 818. 819. 820.

Grey, Exper. & Nat. chem. &.

Obj: :- If we increase the conditions,
we could make wheat grow or
crops
Reply: :- Nature could be like a
good chef, she would cook that very

l'un vis-à-vis l'autre } peut-on } peut-on

"... howe'er
Fate rules his fortune, ...
Antipone

Fated misfortune hath a power so fell:
Not wealth, nor warfare wild,
Nor dark spray-dashing courses of the main
Against great destiny may once rebel.
itid.

To yield is dreadful: but resistingly
To face the blow of fate, is full of dread.
....
Oh! it is hard. But I am forced to this
Against myself. I cannot fight with Destiny.
itid.

~~My~~
No life of mortal, howsoe'er it stand,
Shall once have praise or censure from my mouth;
Since human happiness and human woe
Come even as fickle Fortune smiles or frowns;
And none can anger aught from what we see.
itid.

Oedipus-like tale in Herodotus, Hist. I, His Prince
de Cyrus, I 34-46.

Richard II iii. i. 12:

Myself, a prince by fortune of my birth.

Dial.

We reason to acquire scientific knowledge.

(a) When attain this end, the reasoning is demonstr., i.e., when prem.

(b) " we do not, dial.

Yes, here too we aim at certitude.

But the necessity is % *hypothetical*, the
premises falling short of the requirements of demonstr.,
and the end not assured.

True
primary
immed
prior to & better
known than
Required %
necess. / prior. If
these conditions are
given, the conclusion
follows with abn. nec

Dial. induction.

Reasoning is inductive only in a remote sense:

e.e. a progression for singulars to universals:
by enumeration, not by connexion of terms.

When complete, ep., that each kind of tr...,
we know the univ. according to number, 4.1,
not species; i.e. not as triangle. Post An. II, 101^a, 7. 109.

When incomplete, dialectical.

E.g. that the skilled man in general is lost at
his work because the pilot is...

As long as the middle term is seen only in the
light of singulars - the argt is only induct. dial.

Diff. betw. dialect. syl. & dial. induction.

Induction more convincing. Topics, I, 13. 105^a 15

Dial. & proper principles, I, c. 2. 101^a 37-101^a 34.

[In conduct, the applic. of a principle to his game..., is *comparative*.

The pract. discourse is *comparative* resolution when the means
toward the end are considered as causes of the operation; this is
in the order of execution, where the end is effect.

In practical syllog., the means or cause is in the
conclusion, and the middle term is the taken, not as a cause,
but as an effect. Ep. Temperance (the end) is achieved through
abstain. (means); Such a person in such circumstances (particular
agent) must attain temperance (end); i. Such a person in such
circumstances (particular agent) must keep total abstinence (means).

The effect is no more than a posterior condition of cause of
the conclusion. It does not necessarily follow; the conclusion
remains contingent.

Plp. I

1/2 rds of human contrivance

PN

"Prima substantia" vera prima forma:

{ in act.
in natural.

2. Vol. I. c. 1, n. 1404

PN

Quidem distribuerunt an forma et essentiam?

duobus rationibus:

{ (3) quia a forma, taliter essentia determinatur.
(4) nullus antiquiorum aliquid determinavit de hoc

Resp. ad (3): aliqui determinaverunt factum de eadem
(4) Quia antiquiorum ~~factum~~ determinaverunt causam
etiam plus sunt; nulla autem causa
fuit a forma et essentia. Postea, nihil
poterunt quidem per a forma et essentiam
(3) Forma aliquando vixit

Quidem dixerunt essentia esse causam soli et tantum per se
Implet: (4) Mirabile quod animalia a natura, eadem a
(3) Naturae et essentiae.

Contrary.

Quicquid semper et non contingens semper
et sed ex accidentibus. De Caelo I, Q. 26, n. 6.
(258)

Obj. I. p. 9, a. 2.

vel differentiae entis veri: tunc sumuntur logicae,
et existunt in sola latitudine communium.
vel differentiae entis veri, seu per se, et non
quod significat substantiam, quantitates, etc.,
et sic sunt conditiones substantiales.
verum intrinsece ipsius rebus; et sic
dicta de corruptibili et incorruptibili.

Nep. causal. univ. = material:
 individu material rend compte
 de la forme suff.
 Chiquenaud de Des. remontrant
 posit. d' une grande dégringole

Qd opus naturae, subit. ind.

Oculis qur.

I II 122, 3^m

II Phys. 6/9 b (Sur pres. de ces univ.)

II Phys. 12/5 (inconv. compar. eff. part. & ca univ.)

de Ver. XI, 2, c. (apud univ. & acquit.)

II de Caelo 10/3; 13/7 (Eff. in C. nat. sec. 2^a univ.)

I^a 12/5/1^m

de Ver. IX, 13, 3^m

II Op. 21

III Op. 77 & 99

univ. & equid.

& I^a 9. 4, a 3.

I Met., l. 6, m 107-9: Naus d' Anax. & caus. pignus.

II de Caelo, l. 9, 2. 2: quid "natura univ."

Nous avons acquis une sorte d'immunité
contre les probl. vraiment phiques.

À la nais. de chaque homme renait l'ignorance.

On attribue à la nature plus de rationalité qu'elle n'en
a, peut-être le fruit de l'ignorance.

Au lieu de parler de valeurs, il parle du bien et
de cet du bien.



Série de
Hypothèses répétées :

- (a) Cela marche sans cause univ.
- (b) concept biol.
- (c) Tout cela tient pourvu qu'on
accepte la mythol. Copernic
des VI et VIII de l'ère
- (d) le fait que d'autres soutiennent
le contraire
- (e) le fait qu'on n'ait depuis longtemps
raison d'être, que ces arg. ne
tiennent plus



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La définition Russellienne du nombre \neq n'est pas du
tout celle du nombre. ~~WPA~~ (réfée.)

Les interventions spéciales conçues de manière anthropomorphiques.
d'abord, ce n'est pas une intervention.

Si un homme trouve très clair ce qui est fort obscur, le
is beyond help - there is no time for him. Il est
de sang cartésien

Les vaches, apparemment, ne se posent pas de
questions de ce genre, mais qui ne voit qu'elles
ne cessent pas pour autant d'exister? L'auteur
ne semble pas avoir saisi le secret de l'avantgarde.

Ce genre de philosophie est pensée, autant que
la nature ...

Ta via

Sicut causa em
ita causa motus.

Il faudrait que la subst. séparée soit
elle-m^e le principe premier de ce
par quoi elle m^e i.e. aucune
potentialité.



Quod possibile est non esse
 { - vel semper fuit - et tunc
 necessarium erat quod ad hoc
 - vel semper erit - et tunc etiam
 est necessarium.

Unde, si omnia possunt esse et non
 esse, nisi aliquando non
 potuerunt non esse, aliquando
 nihil fuit in celis. Id est, si
 semper aliquid fuit, tunc
 non potuit non esse, unde
 non erat possibile esse et
 non esse.

Rep. I

Tooe. Aristotle's main concept: origin. Had a text.
 But some text is just rephrased in his own
 but on the, however - i.e. when separated.
 By a hand called text by others.
 See Brown on Technology and the Origin
 too. What the sense of intelligence. Aristotle this
 is not leading to simply making of its own. In a
 sense right.
 Strongly put forward. Text first in nature,
 the mind, and, and necessity of mind to seek
 nature then speaking of more directly, simply
 and only with and. Part. 20. Place is also mentioned.
 Where the mind is. The first word in second.

PN

Rep. II

Forma cop. est. dictum "universalis" quia replat
 totum potuit. mat. - Nonum script. dictum
 forma "particularis". Deest I, t. 4, n. 6

Rep. II 3

In mat. non dicitur. In operibus. In 44, 1, 2

PN